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I. INTRODUCTION

When the organizers of this symposium asked me to present a paper involving
the regulation of international financial services in the twenty-first century, my
initial reaction was "What do I look like, a banker?" Yet, the importance of my field,
corporate law, to the regulation of international financial services becomes evident
with some further reflection. One potentially significant trend in international
finance underway as the new century begins is the desire of nations around the
world to develop stock markets which are similar to the United States.' The goal is
for equity from dispersed investors to supplement, if not significantly supplant, the
role of banks in providing corporate finance. Time does not permit this paper to
canvass this entire trend. Instead, this paper will focus on the spread of one
particular type of regulation aimed at developing deep and liquid stock markets
around the world, specifically the prohibition of trading on inside information. The
hope is that this examination of one particular type of regulation can serve to

*
1.

Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law.
Infra text accompanying notes 29-31.
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illustrate the broader forces at work as nations around the world seek to imitate
United States' stock exchanges.
This paper will examine the globalization of insider trading prohibitions in four
steps. The first step, in Part II of this paper, is to describe the explosive growth
which has occurred in the number of nations whose laws prohibit trading on inside
information concerning stock. Next, Part III of this paper looks at some of the
principal variations in the specific prohibitions that nations have enacted. Part IV of
this paper then analyzes whether insider trading prohibitions are likely to achieve
the goals of the nations who enacted them. Finally, Part V concludes this paper by
turning the spotlight back on the United States, and asks whether there are any
lessons Americans can learn from the spread of insider trading prohibitions abroad.
II. THE SPREADING PROHIBITION ON INSIDER TRADING

Around a decade ago, I decided to pose a pure policy question on the final
examination for my Business Associations course. The question asked the students
to assume that they had been retained as consultants by the government of an
Eastern European country which just switched from a command to a market
economy and was interested in developing private ownership of corporations and
a stock market. The government of this country wanted advice on what law it should
have with respect to trading stock based upon information known to one party to the
trade but not to the other party (in common parlance, trading on inside information,
or insider trading). The overwhelming majority of students responded by stating that
this Eastern European country should prohibit trading on inside information along
lines following the students' understanding of United States' law.
This result should not have been surprising. Despite efforts of professors to
instill critical policy analysis of laws, most American law students, and indeed most
American lawyers and lay persons, seem imbued with an instinctive belief that
American laws must be the best laws. 2 Still, I felt I had grounds for disappointment.
Unlike the situation with murder, robbery or bribery,3 there has been no
longstanding or universal condemnation among human civilizations of transacting
business based upon inside information.4 Indeed, the United States appears to have
been the first country to prohibit trading by corporate insiders on inside

2.
I also suspect that many students advocated adoption of the American law simply because this allowed
these students to demonstrate their knowledge of the specifics of the prohibition under United States' law.
3.
See, e.g., JOHNT. NOONAN,JR., BRIBES (1984) (discussing historical universal condemnation of bribery).
4.
See e.g.,Joel Seligman, The Reformation ofFederalSecuritiesLaw ConcerningNonpublic Information,
73 GEo. L.J. 1083, 1091-1102 (1985) (discussing traditional common law acceptance of insider trading); Ramzi
Nasser, The MoralitY ofInsider Trading in the United States andAbroad,52 OKLA. L. REv. 377,377 (1999) (stating
that Japanese and many other persons outside of the United States do not consider insider trading immoral).

The TransnationalLawyer/ VoL 15
information. What is more, the prohibition on insider trading in the United States
arose as an almost accidental byproduct from the Securities Exchange Commission's
(SEC) adoption of a rule whose language and initial purpose attacked very different
conduct.6 In 1967, France became the second country to enact an insider trading
prohibition. Although the 1980s witnessed an increasing number of nations
adopting laws against insider trading, only thirty-four nations had laws prohibiting
insider trading by 1990.8 Of those countries, only nine had enforced their law by
prosecuting someone for insider trading. 9 Hence, when my students wrote their
answers, most nations seemed to be getting along without laws prohibiting insider
trading. At the same time, a respectable set of academic commentary had arisen in
1°
the United States criticizing the prohibition on insider trading.
Jingoist as their answers might have been, my students turned out to be rather
prescient, at least insofar as they advocated some prohibition of trading on inside
information (as opposed to following precisely the United States' rules). The decade
of the 1990s witnessed an explosion in the number of nations adopting laws
prohibiting insider trading. By 2000, eighty-seven countries had adopted laws
prohibiting insider trading;" and, suggesting this was not all cosmetic, thirty-eight
2
nations had undertaken at least one prosecution of insider trading under their laws.
Several events contributed to this growth. My final examination question
reflects one of these events. The fall of the iron curtain and the development of
market economies in the formerly socialist economies of Eastern Europe led to the
spread of stock markets. This, in turn, led some nations, who previously had little
reason for concern over insider trading (because they had little or no stock trading
in any event), to enact insider trading prohibitions.13 Yet, this explanation covers
only a small part of the story. While the 1990s witnessed a significant increase in the
number of countries with stock markets, the number of nations with insider trading
regulations grew much more rapidly. As a result, the world evolved from a situation,
at the start of the 1990s, in which the majority of countries with stock markets did

Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading, at http://papers.ssm.
5.
comlso13/delivery.cfm/991215308.pdf.abstractid=200914, at 11 (last visited Oct. 30,2001) (copy on file with The
TransnationalLawyer).
Infra text accompanying notes 36-38.
6.
Bhattacharya & Daouk, supranote 5, at 12. While France was the first nation outside the United States
7.
to outlaw some forms of insider trading, the province of Ontario, Canada adopted an ordinance imposing
administrative and civil liability for insider trading in 1966. Nasser, supranote 4, at 385.
Bhattacharya & Daouk, supra note 5, at 3.
8.
Id.
9.
10. See generally HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKETS (1966); Dennis W. Carlton
& Daniel R. Fisehel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REv. 857 (1983); Michael Dooley,
Enforcement ofInsiderTrading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1 (1980).
11. Bhattacharya & Daouk, supranote 5, at 3.
12. Id.
13. See, e.g.,DariuszM.Budzen &AniaM.Frankowska,ProhibitionsAgainstInsiderTradingIn the United
States and the European Community: Providing Guidancefor Legislatures of Eastern Europe, 12 BOs. U. INT'L
L. J. 91, 125-26 (1994) (describing Polish law).
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not prohibit insider trading, to a situation where the overwhelming majority of
countries with stock markets had enacted such a prohibition by the year 2000.'"

A significant component of the move of nations with existing stock markets to
adopt insider trading prohibitions occurred in the European Community (now the
European Union or EU). Toward the end of 1989, the Council of European
Communities adopted its Insider Trading Directive. 5 At the time, some European
Community members (such as England) had laws prohibiting certain forms of
insider trading,' 6 while other members (such as Italy and Ireland) had no
prohibition, 7 or (as with Germany) addressed the matter only through voluntary
codes of conduct.'8 The EU Directive commanded all member nations to enact laws
by 1992 prohibiting insider trading within certain minimum guidelines. The result
of the EU Directive was to force members such as Italy' 9 and Germany 20 to enact
(over significant internal opposition and resulting delay in Germany) insider trading
prohibitions. Other member nations, such as England, had to modify their insider
trading prohibitions to meet the EU Directive's minimum mandates.2 '
European nations were hardly alone among the countries with established stock
markets in adopting insider trading prohibitions during the late 1980s and the 1990s.
For example, a year before the EU Directive, at the opposite end of the world, Japan
amended its securities laws to add a provision explicitly making some insider
trading a crime.22 Before this time, Japanese authorities had refused to interpret the
broad anti-fraud provision in the Japanese securities law to reach insider trading,23
and had authorized, but never imposed, administrative sanctions on certain insiders

14. Before 1990, just over half of the developed countries with stock markets had laws prohibiting insider
trading, while less than 40% of the countries with emerging markets did. By 2000, 87 of the 103 nations with stock
markets, including all of the developed countries, and 80% of the countries with emerging markets had such laws.
Bhattacharya & Daouk, supra note 5, at 3, 11.
15. Council Directive 89/592 of November 13,1989 Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing, 1989 O.J.
(L 334) 30 [hereinafter EU Directive].
16. Company Securities Insider Dealing Act of 1985.
17. Budzen & Frankowska, supra note 13, at 115 n.153.
18. Id.atll5n.152.
19. For a discussion of the Italian insider trading prohibition, see generally Eugenio Ruggiero, The
Regulation ofInsiderTrading In Italy, 22 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 157 (1996).
20. For a discussion of the German insider trading prohibition, see generally James H. Freis, Jr., An
Outsider's Look into the Regulation of Insider Trading in Germany: A Guide to Securities, Banking, and Market
Reform in FinanzplatzDeutschland, 19 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (1996).
21. See, e.g., Criminal Justice Act, 1993, §§ 52, 56, 60(4). For a discussion of the English insider trading
prohibition, see Roberta S. Karmel, TransnationalTakeover Talk-Regulations Relating to Tender Offers and
Insider Trading in the UnitedStates, the United Kingdom, German), andAustralia, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1133, 114849(1998).
22. Shoken torihikiho [Securities and Exchange], Law No.25 of 1948, arts. 190-2, 190-3 [hereinafter SELI.
For a translation of the Japanese insider trading provisions, see generally Tomoko Akashi, Note, Regulation of
Insider Trading in Japan, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1296 (1989).
23. The Japanese refused such interpretation even though this provision tracked the language of the
American securities law rule (Rule 1Ob-5) which, as discussed later in this paper, serves as the basis for the United
States' insider trading prohibition.
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24
trading on confidential information obtained in the course of employment. Even
some nations that already had insider trading laws amended their statutes during this
time to strengthen the prohibition. For instance, in 1991, Australia replaced its
previous complex and detailed statutory scheme with a much simpler and
extraordinarily broad prohibition.2
Several forces seem to have led to the dramatic recent growth in insider trading
prohibitions even among nations which already had stock markets. One force may
be simply instinctive imitation spawned by the growing cultural and economic
dominance of the United States at the close of the Twentieth Century. In other
words, the spread of insider trading prohibitions might reflect nothing more rational
than the securities law mirror of the spread of American rock-and-roll, Levi's Jeans,
and McDonald's hamburgers. Indeed, the timing of the spread of insider trading
prohibitions lends credence to this explanation. The 1980s witnessed highly
26
publicized insider trading prosecutions in the United States. The important agent
of dispersing American culture, Hollywood, did its part to vilify insider trading at
about this time in the movie Wall Street.27 As a result, instances of insider trading
outside the United States-such as a 1987 incident involving Hashin Sogo Bank's
disposal of its shares in Tatecho Chemical Industries the day before the Japanese
chemical company publicly announced massive losses-which, in an earlier time,
might have passed without comment, generated significant publicity and calls for
action.28
Of course, governments are hardly going to adopt insider trading prohibitions
based upon the express rationale that if American rock-and-roll is good, so must be
American style insider trading prohibitions. Moreover, a rationale that the
government should make insider trading illegal because the conduct is unfair and
immoral raises the question as to why, if that is the case, the law allowed the
conduct for so many years. Hence, it is not surprising that the express rationale in
many countries for making insider trading illegal looks to pragmatic economic
considerations. Specifically, nations around the world have sought to increase the
depth and liquidity of their local stock markets to match the sort of depth and
29
liquidity found on the New York Stock Exchange. The hope is that the broader
investor base promoted by such markets would lower the cost of capital for local
corporations, thereby aiding the ability of local corporations to compete in the global

24. E.g., Akashi, supra note 22, at 1298-99.
25. Corporations Act, 1998, § 1002G(1) (Austl.).
26. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (involving leaking the contents of the Wall
Street Journal's "Heard on the Street" column); see also In re Ivan F. Boesky Securities Litigation, 36 F. 3d 255
(2d Cir. 1994) (involving the highly publicized insider trading by arbitrageur, Ivan Boesky).
27. Wall Street (20th Century Fox 1987).
28. E.g., Akashi, supra note 22, at 1302-03.
29. E.g., William Bratton & Joseph McCahery, ComparativeCorporateGovernance and the Theory ofthe
Finn: The Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 213, 236-37 (1999); Freis, supra
note 20, at 27-28.
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economy. 30 In addition, the highly visible corporate valuations provided by such
markets, it is hoped, can serve to promote efficient management and resource
allocation.3 Governments have come to believe that among the regulations
necessary (for reasons I shall discuss later) for deep and liquid stock markets is a
ban on at least some amount of trading on inside information.3"
III. VARIATIONS IN INSIDER TRADING PROHIBITIONS
So far, this paper has discussed insider trading prohibitions without being at all
precise as to what conduct these laws prohibit. This is because insider trading
prohibitions around the world differ as to when it is illegal for a party in possession
of information unknown to the other side to buy or sell stock without first disclosing
the information. As a sampling of this variation, Figure 1 provides a table comparing
the insider trading prohibitions in the United States, under the EU Directive, in
Australia, and in Japan.

30. See, e.g., Bernard Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditionsfor Strong Securities Markets, 48
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 781, 832-34 (2001). Because stock exchange trading constitutes, for the most part, secondary
trading rather than initial issuances by corporations seeking to raise money, the impact of deep and liquid stock
markets on corporate cost of capital often is indirect. The liquidity provided by such markets makes a larger set of
investors more willing to purchase stock in public offerings by corporations at a lower rate of return, thereby
allowing corporations to sell their stock at a higher price. Moreover, the ability to sell stock in a public market
following an initial public offering by the corporation is a critical factor in the willingness of venture capital firms
to fund new and growing businesses prior to the businesses going public. Id. at 833.
31. Actually, underlying this point is an entire debate about the impact of stock market pressures on
corporate governance. During the 1980s, when foreign companies seemed to be outperforming United States'
corporations, it was popular to argue that pressures to maintain stock prices in public markets led to short-sighted
management decisions. See, e.g., Bratton & McCahery, supra note 29, at 235 (1999). By the 1990s, when American
firms seemed to be outperforming foreign companies, it became fashionable to argue that pressure to maintain stock
prices in public markets served as an important discipline on inefficient management decisions. See, e.g., Jeffrey
Gordon, The Shaping Force of Corporate Law in the New Economic Order,31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1473, 1484-87
(1997).
32. E.g., Freis,supra note 20, at 30-31; Ruggierosupra note 19, at 160-61; Karmel, supranote 21, at 1152;
Akashi, supra note 22, at 1312.
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FIGURE 1: COMPARISON OF INSIDER TRADING LAWS
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A.

Source of the Prohibition

Before comparing the substance of various insider trading prohibitions, it is
worth noting the difference in the source of the prohibition. The source of the
prohibition contemplated by, and resulting from, the EU Directive, as well as in
Australia, Japan, and, indeed, in most other countries outside the United States, is
legislation specifically addressing insider trading.33 By contrast, for the most part,
the prohibition on insider trading in the United States results from administrative
and judicial interpretations of a broad anti-fraud rule adopted by an administrative
agency pursuant to authority under an even broader statutory provision. The
difference between the ad hoc development of the United States' prohibition, and
the enactment in other countries of specific legislation dealing with the issue, brings
to mind Bismark's comment about laws and sausages-that, in both cases, public
confidence might be better served if people saw only the end result rather than how
the item was made.
It is sometimes said that the United States' insider trading prohibition goes back
to the enactment of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.34 Such statements are
misleading. True, Congress was concerned, among other things, with insider trading
when enacting the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. The 1934 Act, however, did not
prohibit anyone from trading on inside information. Instead, Congress included a
provision (Section 16(b)) in the Act, which requires certain insiders (specifically,
directors, officers, and owners of over ten percent of a class of the corporation's
stock registered under the Act) to hand over to the corporation any profit they make
on buying and then selling, or selling and then buying, stock in their company
within a period of six months (so-called short-swing transactions). Hence, under the
1934 Act, anyone was free to trade on inside information, and even directors,
officers, and more than ten percent shareholders could trade on inside information
and keep their profits so long as they did not make an offsetting trade within six
months.
Congress also included a provision (Section 10(b)) in the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act, which makes it unlawful to employ, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security, any "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in
contravention of rules promulgated by the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC). The idea behind Section 10(b) is to complement the specific requirements
and prohibitions in the federal securities laws with a catch-all provision empowering
the SEC to define and prohibit manipulative or deceptive conduct which otherwise
might fall between the cracks in the statutory scheme.36 Among the specific
33. See, e.g., Freis,supra note 20, at40-41;Ruggiero, supranote 19,at 159; Karmelsupra note 21, at 115254; Akashi, supra note 22, at 1296-97.
34. E.g., Bhattacharya & Daouk, supra note 5, at 11.
35. The Securities Exchange Commission [hereinafter SEC or Commission] is the agency established by
the 1934 Act to enforce the federal securities laws.
36. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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prohibitions the SEC has adopted pursuant to its authority under Section 10(b) is
Rule lOb-5.
Rule lOb-5 has a rather modest origin. In 1942, the SEC's staff learned of an
incident in which a corporation's president was going around lying to the
corporation's shareholders in order to buy up stock on the cheap. The staff's
problem was that the specific anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws
were concerned with misrepresentations to sell securities, and did not prohibit
deception in the course of purchasing securities. To close this gap, the staff proposed
the SEC promulgate a new rule, Rule lOb-5, pursuant to the agency's authority
under Section 10(b). In a nutshell, Rule lOb-5 makes it unlawful to commit fraud
in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. The SEC, with little
deliberation, adopted the staffs proposed new rule.3"
Nearly two decades passed before anyone applied Rule lOb-5 to trading on
undisclosed inside information. In 1961, the SEC brought a disciplinary action,
pursuant to its authority to regulate stock brokers, against the Cady, Roberts
brokerage firm. 8 A broker in the Cady, Roberts firm received a tip from a corporate
director-who was also associated with Cady, Roberts-that the corporation's board
had just voted to cut the dividend, whereupon the brokerage firm was able to sell the
firm's and the firm's clients' stock in the corporation before the corporation
announced the board's decision to the public. The SEC held that the brokerage firm
violated Rule lOb-5. A few years after Cady, Roberts, the SEC filed suit against
various officials of Texas Gulf Sulfur Company to discipline their actions in trading
on inside information.39 These officials purchased stock in the corporation after the
corporation made a major copper discovery, but before public disclosure of this
discovery. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that this conduct
violated Rule 1Ob-5. 40
There are a couple of points worth noting about these initial efforts to apply
Rule lOb-5 to prohibit insider trading. To begin with, while it may offend national
sensitivities to mention this, the French adoption of an insider trading prohibition
41
in 1967 follows rather closely in time upon these U.S. developments. In addition,
the scope of the United States' prohibition announced by the SEC and the Second
Circuit was very broad. In fact, the thrust of the Cady, Roberts opinion was to
respond to the brokerage firm's contention that, because the firm was not an insider,
Rule lOb-5 did not prohibit the brokerage firm's trading without disclosure. The
Commission rejected this argument by reasoning that the obligation to disclose arose
from a relationship giving access to information intended only to be available for a

37. For a participant's recollection of how Rule lOb-5 came into being, see Milton Freeman, Comments at
the Conference on Codification of the FederalSecurities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922 (1967).
38. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
39. See generally SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 258 F.Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
40. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851 (2d Cir. 1968).
41. The District Court decision in Texas GulfSulfur came in 1966. See generally Texas GulfSulfur Co., 258
F. Supp. 262 (1966).
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corporate purpose rather than personal benefit, coupled with the unfairness of one
party taking advantage of information which he or she knows is unavailable to those
with whom he or she is dealing. Similarly, the Second Circuit in Texas Gulf Sulfur
did not focus on the defendants' status as insiders in finding that they had a duty to
disclose before trading. Rather, after expressing the view that the policy of Rule
1Ob-5 is to ensure all investors have relatively equal access to material information,
the Second Circuit stated that "anyone in possession of material inside information"
must disclose or abstain. 42
In decisions in 1980,43 1983, 44 and 1997,45 the United States Supreme Court
completely rewrote the law of insider trading under Rule lOb-5, shifting from the
broad equal access approach of Cady, Roberts and Texas Gulf Sulfur, to a rather
convoluted approach outlined in Figure 1. The Supreme Court's approach is the
result of trying to import common law concepts of "fraud ' 46 to reach results
consistent with Cady, Roberts and Texas Gulf Sulfur-but inconsistent with either
the way common law courts, for the most part, viewed insider trading,4 7 or with the
broad rationale of Cady, Roberts and Texas Gulf Sulfur.The result is a jurisprudence
loaded with doctrinal inconsistencies and anomalies, a discussion of which is far
beyond the scope of this paper.48
B. Type of Information
Figure 1 begins with a category where the various insider trading prohibitions
share an essential similarity. In every instance, the law limits the prohibition to
situations in which the information possessed by the party trading is both non-public
and significant. After all, unless one wishes to ban corporate insiders from holding
stock in their companies, one cannot complain when insiders trade while in
possession of information which is public knowledge or, if not known to the public,
is trivial.

42. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d at 848 (1968).
43. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
44. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
45. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
46. "Fraud" was a common law term long before its use in Rule lOb-5.
47. See, e.g., Seligman, supranote 4, at 1102.
48. For a discussion of the inconsistencies and anomalies in the Supreme Court's insider trading decisions,
see, e.g., FRANKLIN GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 6.3a; Donald Langevoort, Setting the Agendafor Legislative
Reform: Some Fallacies,Anomalies, and Other Curiositiesin the PrevailingLaw of Insider Trading, 39 ALA. L.
REv. 399 (1988). This is not to suggest that the adoption of insider trading legislation in other countries represented
a completely rational process without its own inconsistencies or anomalous reasoning. See, e.g., Ruggiero, supra
note 19, at 162 (decrying hasty adoption of insider trading legislation by the Italian Parliament as part of a package
of laws designed to make Italian financial markets more like the United States). The difference may be that the ad
hoc evolution simply makes all of the inconsistencies and anomalies more obvious.
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Occasionally, questions arise about whether the information used in trading was
non-public. 9 In fact, the Japanese and the European Union have followed some
interesting approaches to the question of whether information is non-public. For
example, the issue in Japan comes down to whether the corporation has made
disclosure of the facts in question in accordance with criteria set forth in a Cabinet
Ordinance, regardless of whether the investing public actually knows about the facts
in question.50 Also, the recitals of the EU Directive state that an analysis derived
from publicly available data does not constitute non-public information.5 1
The much more frequent area of dispute, however, arises in determining when
non-public information is significant enough to trigger the prohibition. One
approach, which is followed in the United States and Australia, is to set out a broad
standard for courts to apply as cases arise. In the United states, the information must
be "material"--meaning that a reasonable investor would find the information
important in deciding whether to buy or sell stock. 52 Similarly, in Australia, the
information must be such that a reasonable person would expect it to have a material
effect on the price or value of the stock, or the information would be likely to
influence investors in deciding whether to buy or sell the stock. 3 The problem with
such a broad standard is that its application is highly fact sensitive and case specific,
making it potentially more difficult to resolve litigation, and for insiders to decide
whether they must disclose information before trading.5 4 The EU Directive
seemingly gives somewhat more guidance. The information must be precise, relate
to the issuer of the traded security or to the security itself, and be likely to have a
significant effect on the price of the traded security.
Japanese law attempts much greater specificity. The Japanese insider trading
statute contains a laundry list of important facts that can trigger the insider trading
prohibition.56 These include: management decisions about issuing securities,
reductions in capital, stock splits, alterations in dividends, mergers, purchases or
sales in whole or in part of a business, dissolution, and marketing a new product;
disasters or damages to the corporation; changes in principal shareholders; events

49. See, e.g., SECv. Texas Gulf Sulfur, 401 F.2d 833, 846 (2d Cir. 1968) (involving a question as to whether
sufficient time had passed after the corporation issued a press release, so that, when an insider traded, the released
information was no longer non-public); Leadenhall Australia Ltd. v. Peptech Ltd., 1999 NSW LEXIS 810 (finding
alleged inside information to be a matter of public record, even if not known to the plaintiff).
50. E.g., Akashi, supra note 22, at 1317-18 (describing Japanese Cabinet Ordinance No. 321 of 1965, art.
30 (as amended by Cabinet Ordinance No. 23 of 1989)). In order to avoid applying the limited definition of public
information to reach obviously silly results, however, the Japanese statute exempts trades solely among insiders and
tippees from the prohibition of trading on inside information. SEL, supra note 22, art. 190-2(5)(7).
51. EU Directive, supra note 15, 13th Recital.
52. See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
53. See, e.g., Corporations Act, 1998, §§ 1002C, 1002G(1)(a) (Austi.);Ampolex, Ltd. v. Perpetual Trustee
Co., Ltd., 1996 NSW LEXIS 2827.
54. See, e.g., Basic,485 U.S. at 236 (noting the problem, but refusing to adjust the definition of materiality).
55. EU Directive, supranote 15, art. 1(1).
56. However, if the Ministry of Finance considers the facts too immaterial to affect investment decisions,
the insider trading provision will not be triggered. SEL, supra note 22, art. 190-2(2).
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causing delisting of a security; differences between actual and forecasted sales and
profits; any other events listed by Cabinet Ordinance; and, finally, other important
facts involving the management, business or assets of the corporation which would
materially affect investment decisions. 7
The probable impact of these different formulations for the required significance
of inside information may vary. For example, standards based upon whether a
reasonable investor would consider a fact important in making buy and sell
decisions, and standards based upon whether a fact would be likely to impact a
stock's price significantly, should reach the same result. After all, by and large,
investors find facts important because the fact might impact the stock's price, and
if investors find a fact important in deciding whether to buy or sell, the investors'
purchase and sale decisions will impact the stock's price.5 8 By contrast, the
difference between the Japanese list of important facts, and the various open-ended
approaches, seemingly could produce a considerable impact on the scope of insider
trading enforcement and activity. Yet, the Japanese law allows greater flexibility,
while the United States' practice has created greater predictability than it might at
first appear. Specifically, the Japanese statute contains an escape clause adding
pretty much any other material facts to the list.59 Conversely, enforcement actions
in the United States have tended to focus on trading based upon advance knowledge
of earnings reports and takeover activities to such an extent that one writer has
suggested materiality for insider trading purposes in the United States has come to
have an operational definition largely limited to these two types of information.6
The EU Directive's guidelines that the information be precise, and relate to the
issuer or the security, could have subtle, but nevertheless potentially significant,
impacts when compared with results under the general materiality standard. The
requirement that the information be precise stems from the French statute 6' and is
supposed to rule out mere rumors.6 2 The situation in the Texas Gulf Sulftr case
discussed earlier illustrates a possible impact of this requirement. In Texas Gulf
Sulfur, there were rumors circulating in the marketplace regarding a major copper
find by the corporation. Various corporate insiders traded based upon their

57.
58.

Id. art. 190-2.
See, e.g., Ampolex, Ltd. v. Perpetual Trustee Co., Ltd., 1996 NSW LEXIS 2827 (recognizing the

interrelationship).
59. One must be careful, however, before making the facile assumption that the presence of this escape
clause turns the Japanese statute into the equivalent of the American or Australian materiality approach. Such an
interpretation would render the listing of specific types of important facts surplusage, and thus a court could be
reticent about reaching such an interpretation. Cf People v. Jacques, 456 Mich. 352, 572 N.W.2d 195 (1998)
(holding that general terms in a statute, which follow a list of specific items, should be interpreted only to
encompass items of the same kind as the specific items listed).
60. Nejat Seyhun, The Effectiveness of the Insider-TradingSanctions, 35 J. L. & ECON. 149, 151 (1992).
61. E.g., Donald Langevoort, Defining Insider Trading: The Experience In Other Countries, 6 No. 4
INSIGHTS 7, 9 (1992).

62.

Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Coordinating Regulations on InsiderTrading, art. 6, 1987

O.J. (C 153) 8.
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knowledge of this find. It is easy to see that the geologist and other officials who
were privy to the actual data regarding the exploratory drilling had precise
information. On the other hand, as the information passed through various hands,
presumably becoming all the more general, when did it pass from the realm of the
precise to constitute a mere rumor? Under a materiality approach, assessing when
distilled information is too vague and uncertain to form the basis for an insider
trading violation asks a functional question: would a reasonable investor disregard
the information? By contrast, the structure of EU Directive, referring both to
precision and to likelihood of price impact, seems to demand an evaluation of the
precision question independent of the likely impact on investors, and, hence, with
no real world milestone for making the assessment.
The EU Directive's requirement that the information relate to the security in
or to the issuer of the security, 64 at first glance, seems without probable
question, 6316
impact. After all, if the information did not relate to the company or its stock, why
would anyone purchase or sell the stock based upon the information? Perhaps a
government employee might trade based upon some sort of confidential general
economic information to which he or she had access. 65 Here, the EU Directive and
the United States' law would give very different results.
Alternatively, consider the situation which faced the United States Supreme
Court in Carpenterv. United States.66 Carpenterarose out of a scheme by a Wall
Street Journal reporter and several of his friends to trade on their advance
knowledge of the contents of the Journal's "Heard on the Street" column. While the
information in the column was hardly non-public (being known to the Wall Street
Journal), the publication of this column often impacted the price of stocks of
corporations discussed in the column. Given this impact, knowledge of the Journal's
future publication plans constituted material, non-public information. 67 By contrast,
under the EU Directive, one would need to resolve the question of whether plans of
a newspaper to discuss a stock or a corporation constitutes a fact which relates either
to the stock or the issuing corporation.68

63. Generally speaking, "security" refers to the traded stock, albeit the definition of "security" is broader
than stock and can include debt securities and options. The EU Directive only reaches publicly traded securities,
however. EU Directive, supra note 15, art. 1(2).
64. Generally speaking, the "issuer" of securities is the corporation.
65. E.g., Ruggiero, supra note 19, at 183.
66. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
67. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1032 (2d Cir. 1986).
68. In answering this question, one must avoid arguing that the information relates to the stock because the
information will impact the price of the stock. Such reasoning would make the relates language redundant of the
part of the EU Directive's test which demands that the information be likely to have a significant impact on price
of the stock.
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C. Who Is Subject to the Prohibition?
When dealing with the type of information subject to the insider trading
prohibition, the formulations may vary, but the essential idea is always the same.
This is not true when it comes to who is subject to the insider trading prohibition.
Here, one confronts different rules which result from varying views as to why it is
unacceptable for some persons to buy or sell stock while in possession of
information which the other party to the trade does not have.
One view of trading on inside information focuses on the information
asymmetry as the fundamental evil. Under this view, entering a transaction when a
person knows that the other side might not make the same agreement if the other
side knew all the facts is considered unfair. After all, the basis for what is fair or
moral is avoiding conduct toward others to which one would object if done toward
oneself, and many persons feel cheated by non-disclosure of important facts.
Moreover, from the standpoint of economic efficiency, the object is to promote
transactions in which both sides feel better off for having made the deal based upon
complete information. By contrast, transactions that simply shift wealth from an
uninformed party to a well-informed party seemingly represent an inefficient zerosum game. Indeed, the danger of becoming the victim of such a wealth transfer
might make persons, who suspect themselves to be at an information disadvantage,
less willing to invest. As discussed later in this paper, this decreased willingness to
invest, in turn, could undermine the goal of promoting deep and liquid stock markets
and a lower cost of capital. 69 At the extreme, this view of trading on inside
information would seem to suggest a condemnation of any transaction in which one
party possesses information unknown to the other side. No nation, however, follows
such an equal information rule.
The problem is that information is both something of value to society and
something which often takes work to produce. In order to encourage the production
of information, presumably there must be some reward. This is why governments
grant patents to inventors. An equal information rule could undermine the incentives
to search for undiscovered values obtainable from buying or selling stock. 70
Moreover, given the moral undertone of the traditional work ethic, perhaps it is
inconsistent with notions of fairness to suggest that individuals who work to produce
information should not be required to share such information with others who could
have worked to obtain the information for themselves.
On the other hand, suppose a person does not gain knowledge by working hard
to gather information available to anyone who puts in the effort, but rather obtains
the knowledge because of some superior access. For example, in order to carry out
their jobs, corporate officers, directors, and even employees have access to

69. Infra Part IV.
70. E.g., Frank Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges,and the Productionof
Infornation, 1981 SUP. CT. REv. 309, 329-30.

The TransnationalLawyer/ Vol. 15

information concerning the corporation, which is not available to outsiders.
Alternatively, the superior access might consist simply of being in the right place at
the right time to overhear a conversation.71 In this event, one could argue that there
is no reason-either in terms of creating incentives for gathering information, or in
terms of fairness toward those who work to obtain something others could have-to
allow individuals to trade on the information without disclosing the information to
those who lack access.72 This notion leads one toward the equal access rule adopted
by Cady, Roberts and Texas Gulf Sulfur.
While the United States Supreme Court rejected the equal access approach in
Chiarella v. United States,73 Australia adopted an equal access rule in 1991.
Specifically, before 1991, Australia's insider trading law only prohibited trading on
inside information by those connected with the corporation whose stock they
traded. 74 The 1991 revision extended the prohibition to reach any person who
"possesses [material] information that is not generally available. 75
One problem with an equal access rule is defining when access is unequal.For
example, the investment insights of one with superior analytical abilities might not
be available to those less gifted no matter how hard they try. Similarly, the acquiring
company's knowledge of its intent to make a premium price tender offer for stock
in the target corporation reflects both facts open for discovery by anyone (whatever
synergies or opportunities justify paying a premium price for control of the target),
as well as a fact (the acquirer's subjective decision to make the offer) which is
inaccessible to anyone outside of the acquiring company.
A nation which bases its insider trading law on an equal access philosophy has
two mechanisms to deal with possible over-breath or ambiguity in a simple-minded
equal access rule. The mechanism followed by Australia's 1991 law is to create
exceptions to its broad prohibition. For example, the Australian law allows trading
76
without disclosure of one's own intentions (for example, to make a tender offer).
An alternate mechanism to deal with possible over-breadth or ambiguity in a
simple-minded equal access rule is to confine the prohibition to the most common
situations in which unequal access exists, and there is no justification for
nevertheless allowing trading without disclosure. The EU Directive seems to
provide an example of this alternative. 77 The EU Directive demands that member
nations prohibit trading on non-public information by directors or shareholders (or

71. See SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984).
72. E.g., Victor Brudney, Insiders,Outsiders,andInformationalAdvantages Underthe FederalSecurities
Laws,93 HARV. L. REV. 322 (1979).
73. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
74. E.g., Karmel, supranote 21, at 1152.
75. Corporations Act, 1998, § 1002G(1), (2)(a) (Austl.).
76. l at § 1002P.
77. The EU Directive also avoids some possible overreach of an equal access rule by the definition of nonpublic information. As mentioned earlier, the recitals to the EU Directive state that an analysis of publicly available
information is not non-public information.
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the local equivalent); by those who obtain the information through their
employment, profession or duties; and by those who obtain the information from
persons in the prior categories. 78 These categories are likely to pick up the vast bulk
of trades involving unequal access. Hence, it is plausible to conclude that the
residual trades in which there is unequal access (and policy reasons do not dictate
allowing the trade despite the unequal access) do not occur with sufficient frequency
to justify the uncertainties generated by adopting a broad prohibition and making
exceptions.
At first glance, the United States' prohibition appears similar to the EU
Directive. This is not surprising. In Chiarella,the United States Supreme Court
sought to uphold the result of Cady, Roberts and Texas Gulf Sulfur-both of which
had followed an equal access philosophy to hold corporate insiders, and those who
received tips from corporate insiders, liable for trading on inside information.
Moreover, in holding that persons who misappropriate information from their
employer or client can be liable for insider trading, the Supreme Court's opinion in
United States v. O'Hagan79 noted that the result would be consistent with the goal
of the securities law to promote equal access to information among stock traders.80
Nevertheless, the United States' insider trading prohibition ultimately is not a
conscious attempt to prohibit trading in the most common situations in which there
is unequal access to information. Rather, the United States' prohibition is based on
a construct under which silence becomes the equivalent of a fraudulent
misrepresentation, because the silence renders false certain implicit representations
which arise in fiduciary relationships. This difference in the philosophical basis for
the prohibition is not only of academic interest. Rather, it produces a number of
substantive differences in the scope of the United States' and EU Directive's
prohibitions.
The United States Supreme Court's efforts to delineate when trading on
undisclosed inside information violates Rule 1Ob-5 began in the Chiarelladecision
mentioned above. Chiarella worked for a financial printing company. The printing
company's customers included firms which were going to make tender offers to buy,
at a premium price, outstanding stock of other corporations. Despite the customers
having blanked out the names of the target corporations in the documents given to
the printing company, Chiarella was able to figure out the identities of the target
corporations from the surrounding material in the documents. He made around
$30,000 by purchasing stock in the target corporations prior to the announcements
of the tender offers. Ultimately, the SEC uncovered Chiarella's trading, and
Chiarella was convicted of criminally violating Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.

78.
79.
80.

EU Directive, supra note 15, arts. 2(1), 4.
521 U.S. 642 (1997).
Id. at 650-51.
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Chiarella appealed all the way to the Supreme Court, which overturned the
conviction. 81
In order to understand the Chiarelladecision, the actual holding of the case
needs to be separated from the court's rationale, and from a critical issue which the
court expressly left open. The holding of the case involves a jury instruction. The
District Court judge instructed the jury that all they needed to find in order to
convict Chiarella was, in purchasing the stock, that Chiarella used material nonpublic information at a time he knew other people trading in the securities market
"did not have access to the same information.' 8 2 The actual holding in Chiarellawas
that this instruction was wrong-in other words, there is no equal access rule.
If mere possession of material information not accessible to other traders is
insufficient to create a duty to refrain from buying or selling stock, then the
inevitable question becomes what, if anything, can create such a duty? To answer
this question, the Supreme Court in Chiarellacame up with a rationale which a later
Supreme Court opinion would refer to as the "traditional" or "classical" theory.83 In
the traditional or classical theory, the Supreme Court in Chiarella sought to
reconcile the Court's holding with both Cady, Roberts and Texas Gulf Sulfur. To do
so, the Supreme Court in Chiarellafocused on the fact that the defendants in Texas
Gulf Sulfur were directors, officers, and other employees (in popular parlance,
"insiders") of the corporation whose stock the defendants purchased or sold, while,
in Cady, Roberts, the broker had received a tip from such an insider. The
significance of this fact, according to the Supreme Court in Chiarella, is that
insiders have a fiduciary relationship-or a relationship of trust and
confidence-with the shareholders of the corporation in which the insiders are
directors, officers or employees. Under common law, a fiduciary relationship can
make silence the equivalent of fraud because the relationship conveys an implicit
representation that the fiduciary has disclosed material facts without needing to be
asked. 4 Hence, according to the Court in Chiarella,a fiduciary relationship between
the corporate insider and the party with whom the insider trades, creates a duty on
the insider either to disclose material information before trading or to abstain from
the trade. 85 Due to the fact that Chiarella was not an insider in the corporations
whose stock he purchased (he was an employee of a printing company), nor had he
received information from insiders of the corporations whose stock he purchased,86
Chiarella had no duty under the traditional or classical theory.
So long as dealing with insiders, the traditional theory in Chiarellagets to the
same point as an equal access approach or the EU Directive, although based upon

81. Chiarella,445 U.S. at 225.
82. Id.at231.
83. See O'Hagan,521 U.S. 642 (1997).
84. See, e.g., RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 551(2)(a).
85. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228-29.
86. The printing company's customers were the acquiring firms, and Chiarella bought stock in the target
corporations. See id at 224.
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different reasoning. However, divergences in actual results appear as one moves
beyond insiders. Consider, for example, persons who get information from insiders.
Australia's equal access rule provides a simple result: a person who possesses
material information which is not generally available cannot trade. The EU Directive
is also fairly straightforward because it prohibits trading by so-called secondary
insiders.87 These are persons who possess information which could not have come
other than directly or indirectly from a primary insider.88 A primary insider, in turn,
is a person who obtained information by virtue of being a director, shareholder, or
through his or her employment, profession or duties. 89 Notice, the definition of
secondary insiders not only picks up individuals who receive tips (in other words,
information passed on for the purpose of the recipient's trading), but also persons
who simply overhear a conversation by insiders. By contrast, the United States'
approach gives a much more involved answer to the permissibility of trading by
those who receive information from insiders. In large part, this answer comes from
the Supreme Court's opinion in Dirks v. SEC.90
Dirks arose out of a massive fraud at the Equity Funding company. Dirks was
an investment analyst. A disgruntled ex-Equity Funding official, named Secrist,
tipped Dirks off to the fraud in the hope that Dirks would expose the scheme. Dirks
alerted his brokerage firm's clients to the fraud. The clients were then able to unload
their Equity Funding stock prior to the fraud becoming public knowledge. The
Securities Exchange Commission censured Dirks for violating Rule lOb-5 by
tipping his firm's clients to the fraud so that the clients could sell prior to the
information becoming public. Dirks appealed his censure ultimately to the Supreme
Court, which overturned the SEC's action. 9 The challenge for the Supreme Court
in Dirks was to set out an approach which would reconcile finding a violation by the
tippee in Cady, Roberts, with the notion that, under the traditional or classical
theory, only insiders have a duty to disclose before trading.
One possible approach, which is used by the EU Directive, would be to say that
anyone who obtains information from an insider picks up the insider's duty not to
trade. This was the approach used by the SEC in censuring Dirks. The Supreme
Court, however, rejected this sort of "tainted fruit" approach. Instead, the Supreme
Court went back to a concept it had suggested in a footnote in Chiarella.This
concept is that the tippee's liability flows from having acted as a "participant after
the fact" in the insider's breach of duty not to trade on inside information without

87. To be technically accurate, the EU Directive does not, in itself, prohibit anything. As stated earlier, it
requires member nations to prohibit inside trading within the guidelines of the directive-albeit, member nations
can go beyond these guidelines in their prohibitions. With the reader's indulgence, however, this paper will refer
to the EU Directive as prohibiting inside trading, instead of saying each time that the EU Directive commands
member nations to prohibit insider trading.
88. EU Directive, supra note 15, art. 4.
89. Id. art. 2(1).
90. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
91. Id. at 667.
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disclosure.92 Specifically, the Supreme Court reasoned that an insider should not be
able to accomplish indirectly what the insider could not legally do directly.93 Hence,
because allowing an insider to profit by trading on undisclosed inside information
would be illegal, it should be illegal for the insider to profit by passing on
information for another person's use in trading. This rationale, in turn, led the
Supreme Court in Dirks to hold that trading by tippees violates Rule lOb-5 when,
but only when, an insider breaches his or her duty by passing on the tip in order for
the insider to obtain some personal benefit (as, for example, if the recipient of the
94
information were to give the insider something in exchange for the tip). In the
Supreme Court's view, because Secrist (the insider) received no personal benefit
from passing on the information to Dirks, Dirks could not be liable for trading or
advising his clients to trade on the information.9 5
An even more significant difference between the United States' approach and
the EU Directive existed before 1997. The difference involved individuals who
obtained information from sources which did not trace back to the corporation
whose stock they traded. As in Chiarella,this often involves tender offers, where
individuals, like Chiarella, become aware of the intended offer through work on
behalf of the firm planning to make the offer. Under the EU Directive, persons such
as Chiarella are subject to the prohibition because they obtain the information by
virtue of their employment, profession or duties. Under the traditional theory in the
United States, such individuals could not be liable. As a reaction to the Chiarella
decision, the SEC used its rulemaking authority under Section 14(e) of the Securities
Exchange Act 96 to adopt Rule 14e-3 (a). Rule 14e-3 (a) makes it unlawful to trade on
material information concerning a tender offer, when one knows, or has reason to
know, that the information is non-public and comes from the acquiring company,
the target company, insiders of such companies, or persons working on behalf of
either company in connection with the tender offer.
More broadly, in 1997, the Supreme Court sided with a number of lower courts
which had accepted a different theory of liability for persons like Chiarella. The
government had advanced a theory known as the misappropriation theory as an
alternate grounds for affirming the conviction in Chiarella,but the Supreme Court
refused to address a theory which was not within the jury instruction. However, in
UnitedStates v. O'Hagan,97 the Supreme Court finally reached the issue. O'Hagan

92. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 n.12.
93. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662.
94. Id. at 666-67.
95. Id. The Supreme Court in Dirks also discussed persons, such as underwriters, accountants, lawyers and
consultants, who receive information in confidence for a legitimate corporate purpose from insiders. The Court
stated that such persons have the same obligations with respect to trading on information they receive from the
corporation as do corporate officials. Id. at 655 n.14.
96. Section 14(e) makes it unlawful to engage in fraudulent conduct in connection with tender offers, and
grants the SEC authority to promulgate rules reasonably designed to prevent such fraudulent conduct.
97. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
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was an attorney at a Minneapolis law firm. An English company (Grand
Metropolitan) retained O'Hagan's firm to act as local counsel in connection with
Grand Metropolitan's planned tender offer for the stock of a corporation (Pillsbury)
headquartered in Minneapolis. While O'Hagan did no work on this matter, he
learned of the tender offer from another attorney at the firm. 98 O'Hagan then
purchased Pillsbury shares and options to buy Pillsbury shares, and, as a result,
made a profit of over $4 million after announcement of the tender offer. Upon the
discovery of his trading by the SEC, O'Hagan was indicted and convicted of
violating Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 99
Upon appeal, the Supreme Court held that O'Hagan violated Rule 1Ob-5. The
Supreme Court based the violation on O'Hagan's having misappropriated
confidential information (the plans for a tender offer) from both his law firm and
from the firm's client, Grand Metropolitan. 0° Reaching this result required the
Supreme Court to find that misappropriating information can equal a fraud. The
notion is that an individual, such as O'Hagan, who stands in a fiduciary relationship,
expressly or implicitly represents to his or her employer or client that he or she will
act loyally-in other words, that he or she will not embezzle money entrusted to his
or her care, nor misuse information which his or her employer or client made
available and does not wish disclosed or traded upon. If, without disclosing to the
employer or client the fiduciary's subversive intention, the fiduciary then embezzles
money or misuses information entrusted to the fiduciary, the fiduciary has lied in
making this express or implicit representation of loyalty, and thereby has defrauded
the employer or client. 1o

The misappropriation theory closes a considerable gap between United States'
law and the EU Directive. Still, the different underlying bases and resulting
boundaries of the misappropriation theory versus the provision in the EU Directive
dealing with persons obtaining information through their employment, profession
or duties, can produce different outcomes. In some instances, the misappropriation
theory might have a broader reach. For example, it might be possible to
misappropriate information in violation of express or implied representations of
confidentiality made to relatives. 102 Unless the relatives were primary insiders (or
received their information from secondary insiders), the EU Directive presumably

98. Under the EU Directive, the fact that O'Hagan did not work on the transaction might make it uncertain
whether he obtained the information by virtue of his employment, profession, or duties. But see infra note 105. The
broad definition the EU Directive applies to secondary insiders would make it unnecessary to resolve this question.
99. O'Hagan was also convicted of violating Rule 14e-3, the federal mail fraud statute, and even federal
money laundering statutes. O' Hagan, 521 U.S. at 649.
100. Id. at 653.
101. The Supreme Court also had to find that this fraud was "in connection with the purchase or sale of [a]
securit[y]." O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653. Taking a literalist approach, the majority ofjustices in O'Haganreasoned
that because the very act by which O'Hagan misappropriated information was purchasing stock, the fraud
(misappropriating the information by trading on it) was in connection with the purchase of a security. Id.
102. E.g., United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on othergrounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir.
1985); Rule 10b5-2.
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would not reach information that comes from relatives communicating in a nonprofessional setting. 3 In other instances, the EU Directive can have a broader reach
than the misappropriation theory. For example, in situations in which the employer
misappropriation.'t4
does not care about trading by the employee, there would be no
The EU Directive, however, prohibits trading on any non-public information which
05
comes from employment, regardless of the employer's attitude.
Japanese law stands at the opposite extreme from Australia, and is considerably
narrower than the EU Directive or, in most respects, current United States' law. The
Japanese prohibition reaches so-called corporate related parties. This includes
directors, officers, employees, shareholders, as well as persons associated with a
corporation through either a contract or a government supervisory role, who obtain
6
material non-public information by virtue of their relationship with the company. 10
Such corporate related parties cannot trade, while in possession of material nonpublic information, stock of the corporation to which they have a relation,107 or stock
of another company which is subject to a planned tender offer by the corporation to
which they have a relation.'0 8
Notice, the Japanese approach, to a great extent, parrots the United States'
approach under the traditional theory, plus Rule 14e-3. There are, however, some
differences. The traditional theory in the United States would not pickup individuals
obtaining information through a government supervisory role, as does the Japanese
prohibition. Moreover, individuals obtaining information by virtue of a contractual
relationship with the corporation would not count as insiders of that corporation
under Dirks unless there is an expectation that they will hold the information in
confidence.'°9 By contrast, under Japanese law, a contractual relation giving access
to non-public information evidently is enough regardless of the expectation of
confidentiality."0
There are bigger differences between United States and Japanese law with
respect to trading by those who receive information from insiders (so-called
tippees). Under Japanese law, persons receiving non-public information directly

103. Of course, typically, the relatives providing non-public information would either be primary insiders or
have received their information, at least indirectly, from primary insiders, thereby making the trading relative liable
as a secondary insider.
104. E.g., Langevoort, supra note 61, at 408-09.
105. The EU Directive provision, which prohibits trading by persons who obtain information by virtue oftheir
employment, profession or duties, came from the French law, where this language had received a broad
interpretation. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 61, at 8. See also Robert Irving, French InsiderTrading Law: A
Survey, 22 U. MM INTFR-AM. L. REV. 41, 62 (1991) (describing the 1976 conviction of an architect for violating
the French insider trading prohibition, after the architect deduced that ajoint venture was in the works from seeing
a CEO, who had retained the architect's services, talking with the CEO of another company).
106. SEL, supra note 22, art. 190-2(1).
107. Id.
108. Id. art. 190-3.
4
109. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.1 .
110. See SEL, supranote 22, art. 190-2(1)(4).
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from corporate related parties are subject to the prohibition on trading."'l Unlike the
Dirks test in the United States, this does not depend upon a showing that the insider
received a personal benefit by making the tip. 112 Yet, also unlike the United States'
law 1 3 (or the EU Directive), the Japanese prohibition only extends to a person who
receives information directly from a corporate related party, and not to remote
tippees. In other words, the prohibition does not extend to persons (like Dirks'
clients) who received their information from another tippee, rather than the
insider.' 14
Significantly, unlike current United States' law (as well as the EU Directive),
Japanese law does not prohibit trading by persons who gain information through
professional relationships other than with the corporation whose stock they trade,
or with a corporation making a tender offer for the stock they trade.115 Of course, in
many instances-such as when attorneys and financial advisors obtain non-public
information through working on the personal behalf of insiders-traders who obtain
information through professional relationships could be liable as tippees under the
Japanese statute because Japanese law contains no equivalent to the personal benefit
requirement under Dirks. Still, the facts in Carpenterv. UnitedStates 1 6 illustrate the
potential significance of Japan's failure to adopt the equivalent of either the United
States' misappropriation theory or the EU Directive's approach to information
obtained by virtue of one's employment, profession or duties. The Japanese statute
would not have prohibited trading on the advance knowledge of the contents of a
newspaper column, as occurred in Carpenter.
This raises the question of why the Japanese followed the approach laid out
above. The similarity between the scope of the Japanese prohibition, and the scope
of the United States Supreme Court's traditional theory, when coupled with Rule
14e-3, sounds hauntingly like my students' blind advocacy of following at least the
broad outlines of United States' law. It is worth noting in this regard that at the time
the Japanese enacted their insider trading provisions in 1988, the United States
Supreme Court had not accepted the misappropriation theory-at least in the context
of a securities law violation. 17 Moreover, there appears to be a common thread to
most of the Japanese departures from the traditional theory crafted by the United
States Supreme Court. Rejecting Dirks' personal benefit requirement for liability
from tipping, foreclosing liability for remote tippees, and treating persons who
receive non-public information by virtue of a contract with the corporation as an

11. Id. art. 190-2(3).
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., SEC v. Musella, 678 F. Supp. 1060 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding remote tippees liable for
violating Rule 10b-5).
114.
115.
116.
117.

See SEL, supra note 22, art. 190-2(3).
See id. art. 190-3.
Carpenter,484 U.S. 19 (1987).
In Carpenter the United States Supreme Court held that misappropriating information through stock
trading violated the federal mail fraud statute. Id.
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insider regardless of any expectation of confidentiality, all make litigation
simpler.1 18 The Japanese treatment of traders who obtain information by virtue of a
contract or a government supervisory role might also show the impact of events
which precipitate legislation on the contents of the legislation. Specifically, the
insider trading scandal which precipitated the Japanese legislation involved a bank's
use of information gained in putting together a rescue package for a corporation
which had incurred massive losses." 9 On the other hand, the narrowness of the
Japanese prohibition when compared to the United States' misappropriation theory
and the EU Directive might appear to be the reaction of a government which was not
sure how much it really wanted to enact an insider trading prohibition.
D. ProhibitedActs
It should go without saying that the basic prohibition common to all insider
trading laws is that persons, who come within the prohibition, cannot buy or sell
stock on the basis of significant non-public information, as defined by the relevant
law. 120 One question raised by this basic prohibition is whether it is enough that the
trader was in possession of inside information when he or she bought or sold stock,
or whether the information actually must have played at least some role in
motivating the decision to purchase or sell-in short, whether the violation depends
upon use rather than just possession of inside information.121 In the United States,
the circuit courts have split upon the use versus possession issue, 122 leading the SEC
to amend Rule lOb-5 to concede grudgingly that proof of non-use could preclude
finding a violation.'2 The requirement of use, rather than mere knowledge, seems
implicit in the EU Directive's prohibition of "taking advantage" of inside
l
information by purchasing or selling stock.' 24 By contrast, the Australian 25 and
Japanese126 statutes seem to prohibit trading by one in possession of material nonpublic information.

118. See, e.g., Akashi, supra note 22, at 1314 (stating that the purpose of limiting liability to the first tippee
is to provide a bright line rule).
119. See supra text accompanying note 28 (describing the scandal).
120. Also, needless to say, this prohibition extends to setting up others to trade on the insider's behalf using
significant non-public information. See, e.g., EU Directive, supranote 15, art. 3(b).
121. Typically, as in Chiarella,Dirks and O'Hagan,it is fairly obvious that the inside information motivated
the defendant's trade. Occasionally, however, insiders might claim that they would have bought or sold the same
amount of stock at the same time even if they did not know of the undisclosed inside information.
122. Compare United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998), with United States v. Teicher, 987 E2d
112 (2d Cir. 1993).
123. Rule lOb-5-1. While conceding that persons can avoid liability by showing that they did not use (or trade
"on thebasis of") inside information, Rule l0b-5-lcontains a fairly constrained list offacts-a contract, instructions,
or a written plan for the trades, which the insider made before receipt of the information-which would make such
a showing.
124. EU Directive, supranote 15, art. 2(1).
125. See Corporations Act, 1998, § 1002G(2) (Austl.).
126. See SEL, supranote 22, art. 190-2.
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More significant variations among insider trading laws involve tipping. Not
surprisingly, Australia has the broadest prohibition. The Australian statute prohibits
communicating material non-public information to a person who one knows, or
should know, will trade upon the information. 127 Also not surprisingly, Japan has the
narrowest law. The Japanese statute does not prohibit tipping. 128 Instead, the only
way in which the Japanese law deals with the problem is by punishing first-tier
recipients of information who trade. 129 A variation on the fact pattern in the Dirks
case illustrates the gaping hole this leaves in the Japanese insider trading
prohibition. The Japanese law would not have penalized Dirks (who passed on the
inside information to his clients, but did not trade himself), or Dirks' clients (who
traded on the information, but were second-tier tippees), even if Secrist (the Equity
Funding insider who alerted Dirks to the fraud) had sold Dirks the information,
30
rather than alerting Dirks as a good deed.1
United States' law and the EU Directive occupy middle ground on liability for
tipping. Under Dirks, liability of the tipper, as well as the tippee, depends upon
whether the tipper passed on the information for personal benefit.' 3 ' The EU
Directive prohibits primary insiders (i.e., directors, shareholders, and other persons
who gain information by virtue of their employment, profession or duties) from
disclosing inside information to any person except if the "disclosure is made in the
normal course of the exercise of [their] employment, profession or duties."'' 32 The
EU Directive, however, does not prohibit tipping by secondary insiders (i.e., those
who receive information from primary insiders). Notice, this means that Dirks
would not have violated the EU Directive's prohibition in passing on Secrist's tip
to Dirks' clients because Dirks was a secondary insider.'33 Dirks' clients, however,
were also secondary insiders (having received information indirectly from a primary
insider), and under the EU Directive, could not legally trade.

127. Corporations Act, 1998, § 1002G(3) (Austl.).

128. E.g., Akashi, supra note 22, at 1314. One caveat to this conclusion exists if the tipper solicited trading
by the tippee or could be said to be the tippee's accomplice. Id.

129. See supra text accompanying notes 111-14.
130. The legislative history of the Japanese statute leaves open the possibility of treating some intermediate
tippee-tippers as simply conduits, so that the ultimate trader becomes liable as a first-tier tippee. E.g., Akashi, supra
note 22, at 1314. This should prevent blatant efforts to take advantage of this gap in the Japanese statute by setting
up dummy tippees, but it is questionable whether this would have applied to Dirks' role.

131. How this personal benefit test works in the event of multi-tier tipping is not entirely clear. See, e.g.,
GEVURTZ, supra note 48.

132. EU Directive, supra note 15, art. 3(a).
133. While Dirks arguably received Secrist's tip in Dirks' professional role of investment analyst, thereby
making Dirks a primary insider, under this interpretation of the facts, passing on the information to Dirks' clients
would have been in the normal exercise of Dirks' profession.

The TransnationalLawyer/ Vol. 15
E. Intent or Knowledge Requirement
When dealing with prohibitions, it is normal for the law to specify the intent or
knowledge necessary to find a violation. 13 4 Knowledge is normally the important
element of intent in the context of fraud-the law commonly distinguishing between
the false statement which the speaker knows to be false and the false statement
which the speaker mistakenly thought was true.135 Hence, it is not surprising that the
various insider trading prohibitions have requirements with respect to the intent or
knowledge necessary to find a violation.
The EU Directive provides an example. It prohibits "taking advantage" of inside
information "with full knowledge of the facts." 136 This, however, raises the question
as to what facts the trader must know. One fact the trader must know is the inside
information itself. Indeed, it is difficult to understand how a person can "take
advantage" of inside information without knowing inside information. Accordingly,
unless the requirement that the trader "take advantage" of inside information "with
full knowledge of the facts" is simply a redundancy, 137 there must be some other
facts which the trader must know.
The Australian statute is better drafted to answer this question. It requires that
the trader know (or reasonably ought to know) that the information was non-public
and material.138 Realistically, when dealing with trading by insiders of the
corporation whose stock is traded, or other persons who obtain the information
through their employment or the like, this rarely is going to create much of a factual
issue. The context in which persons like Chiarella, O'Hagan, and the Texas Gulf
Sulfur officials received their information, and their unseemly haste in acting on the
information, would make laughable any claims that the parties thought the
information was insignificant or already in the public domain.
More realistic concerns with a defendant's knowledge come up in the context
of tipping. For example, the person who passes on the information might not have
realized that the recipient would trade upon the information. 139 Additionally, the
recipient might not be fully aware of the insider status of the source, especially if the
information has passed through several hands.' 4 In such situations, knowledge
requirements can become important. There are some interesting differences in the
way in which the EU Directive and the Australian statute, as well as United States'

134. In Anglo-American criminal law, this is known as "mens rea."
135. E.g., Deny v. Peek, 14 A.C. 337 (H.L. 1889).
136. EU Directive, supra note 15, art. 2.
137. The reader having arrived at this point may have noticed that avoiding interpretations which render
provisions redundant seems to be a constant problem with the formulations in EU Directive.
138. Corporations Act, 1998, § 1002G(1) (Austl.).
139. Indeed, sometimes the source of the information did not even intend to pass on the information (as, for
instance, if the trader overheard a conversation).
140. Cf. SEC v. Musella, 678 F. Supp. 1060, 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (addressing the knowledge of remote
tippees who consciously chose not to ask their tipper about the source of the information, which they evidently
suspected).
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and Japanese law, deal with these situations, which serve to illustrate several basic
aspects of such knowledge requirements.
To begin with, differences in the scope of the prohibitions create differences in
the knowledge requirements. For example, because Australia's statute generally
prohibits anyone with material non-public information from trading, without regard
to the source of the information, all the trader must know is that the information is
material and non-public. The fact that the trader was unaware of the ultimate source
of the information would only be relevant insofar as this ignorance might bear upon
whether the trader was unaware that the information was non-public. By contrast,
under the EU Directive, because secondary insiders are only liable if the information
they act on came directly or indirectly from primary insiders, the secondary insider's
lack of knowledge of the source of the information could preclude finding a
violation. 141The legislative history of the Japanese statute similarly indicates that the
tippee must know that the information came from a corporate related party, as well
as that the information is material and non-disclosed. 42 Under the United States
Supreme Court's opinion in Dirks, the recipient must not only know of the source
of the information, but must also realize that the tipper was passing on the
information for personal benefit. 143
Next, these statutes illustrate different attitudes toward persons who are
negligent in failing to realize that they were trading on material non-public
information (which, if necessary to a violation under the statute, came from an
insider). As previously noted, the EU Directive requires "full knowledge of the
facts."144 The legislative history of the Japanese statute similarly suggests that actual
knowledge is required. 45 By contrast, as stated above, Australia's statute requires
that the trader knew, or reasonably ought to have known, that the information was
material and non-public. Curiously, the United States' law is unclear on this issue.
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,146 the United States Supreme Court held that
violations under Rule 1Ob-5 require scienter 47 In Dirks, however, the Supreme
Court stated that liability of a tippee depends upon whether the tippee knew "or
48
should know" of the tipper's breach of duty in passing on the information.

141. While trading by secondary insiders only violates the EU Directive if done with "full knowledge of the
facts," showing that the secondary insider knew the exact source of the information might not be necessary.
Secondary insider status results from possessing information, "the direct or indirect source of which could not be
other than" a primary insider. EU Directive, supra note 15, art. 4. Thus, the only fact the trader might need to have
full knowledge of is that the information must have originated with an inside source, even if the trader does not
know who this source was.
142. E.g., Akashi, supra note 22, at 1314.
143. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 651.
144. EU Directive, supra note 15, art. 4.
145. E.g., Akashi, supra note 22, at 1314. Curiously, the Japanese statute itself does not address the issue of
knowledge or intent.
146. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
147. "Scienter" traditionally refers to knowing, or at least reckless disregard of the facts.
148. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660.
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Finally, the EU Directive, the Australian statute, and United States' law each
illustrate different ways of using the knowledge or intent element to differentiate
between legitimate and illegitimate disclosure of information.' 49 Naturally, any law
that penalizes the source of inside information for trading done by the recipient of
the information must avoid prohibiting disclosures for legitimate purposes. For
example, the law should not penalize a partner in a law firm who, as part of a
discussion of firm business, discloses to his fellow partner that the firm is
representing a company planning to make a tender offer for a local corporation,
simply because the other partner then runs off and buys stock in the target
corporation. I15 One approach is to determine whether the disclosure was done for a
legitimate purpose, and to penalize any disclosure leading to trading if the disclosure
was not for such a purpose. The EU Directive takes this approach, prohibiting, as
mentioned earlier, any disclosure of inside information unless made in the normal
course of employment, profession or duties. Australia and the United States take the
opposite approach. Instead of asking if there was a legitimate purpose for the
disclosure, Australian and United States' law focus on whether there was an
illegitimate purpose. Specifically, under Dirks, the test in the United States is
whether the insider passed on the information for trading in order to obtain some
personal benefit.15' Australia, not surprisingly, takes a more expansive view. Under
knew, or
Australian law, the issue is whether the person disclosing the information 52
information.'
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IV. WILL INSIDER TRADING PROHIBITIONS ACIEVE
THE GOALS OF T=E NATIONS ADOPTING
THE PROHIBITIONS?

Whether insider trading prohibitions will achieve the goals of the nations
adopting the prohibitions depends, in the first instance, upon the goal which
motivated the statute. In some instances, the only real objective of the insider trading
law might be simply to have such a law, in which event, the law, by its very
existence, achieves its objective. The insider trading laws of some European
Community member nations, who must adopt prohibitions in order to comply with
the EU Directive, might illustrate this. More broadly, as suggested in Part II of this
paper, many nations may have adopted insider trading prohibitions simply because
the United States, and a growing number of other nations, have such laws.

149. The issue does not arise under Japanese law because Japanese law does not prohibit tipping.

150. Essentially, these were the facts in O'Hagan.
151. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659.
152. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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An alternate goal of such laws might be to combat a practice which nations have
come to believe is unacceptable as a matter of fairness and business morality. 153In
this event, whether insider trading laws achieve their objective depends upon how
one measures success. By one measure, the mere enactment of the prohibition might
achieve the objective, at least in some part, because it expresses society's
disapproval of the conduct. Typically, however, success of a legal prohibition
directed at combating morally unacceptable conduct tends to be measured by the
extent to which the prohibition decreases the extent of the conduct. Such a decrease
might occur by virtue of the deterrence resulting from enforcement of the
prohibition, or because the existence of the prohibition could change attitudes
toward engaging in the conduct. Unfortunately, unlike homicides, robberies, and
other commonly reported crimes, there are no regularly reported statistics on illegal
insider trading.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that insider trading has remained prevalent in
many countries despite passage of laws outlawing the practice.154 Of course, this sort
of evidence is subject to criticism on two counts. To begin with, as comparisons of
citizen perceptions of crime versus actual crime statistics have shown, perceptions
as to the extent of various illegal activities can often significantly diverge from
reality. 155 Moreover, even if insider trading remains prevalent after enactment of a
prohibition, this does not mean that the practice would not be even more prevalent
without enactment of the prohibition.
There also have been attempts to measure more scientifically the impact of
insider trading laws on the prevalence of insider trading. These studies suggest that
the insider trading prohibition in the United States may have shifted the nature of
trading on inside information, but not necessarily decreased the overall extent of
such trading. For example, a 1992 study of publicly reported insider trades in the
United States'56 by Professor Seyhun found that insiders overall outperformed the
market in their trades; in other words, generally, insiders were able to sell their stock
before bad news and purchase stock before good news. 157 Moreover, the ability of
insiders to achieve above-market profits on their trades actually rose after enactment

153. E.g., Nasser, supra note 4, at 377. Whether nations should view insider trading as unacceptable as a
matter of fairness and business morality raises an interesting question as to the transferability of business ethics
norms between different cultures. This is not to say that some cultures accept less ethical conduct, but rather that
culture specific factors might dictate whether conduct should be viewed as ethical. For example, non-disclosure of
material facts becomes deceptive (and hence unethical) if there is a general expectation that persons will disclose
without having to be asked. If expectations are different, then there is no deception.
154. Id. at 382-84 (stating that business persons report that insider trading remains prevalent in Japan, despite
the 1988 enactment of a prohibition on the conduct); Bratton & McCahery, supra note 29, at 270 (explaining that
the German insider trading law is thought to have done little to alter the trading practices of insiders).
155. See, e.g., Wendy Simmons, About HalfofAmericans Still Say There is More Crime in the Country Now

Than a YearAgo, at http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr000907.asp (last visited Sept.7,2001) (copy on file with
The TransnationalLawyer).
156. Keep in mind that there is nothing illegal about insiders buying and selling stock in their corporations;
the prohibition is upon making such trades based upon non-public material information.
157. See generally Seyhun, supra note 60.
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of a 1984 amendment to the Securities Exchange Act, which increased the penalties
for illegal insider trading.1 58 Professor Seyhun suggests that the explanation for the
results in his study lies in the increasing predictability of enforcement actions for
illegal insider trading in the United States. Specifically, once it became clear that
enforcement actions in the United States largely focus on trading in advance of
takeovers and earnings announcements, insiders were able to exploit their
59
informational advantages in other areas with relatively little fear of prosecution.1
Notice, this suggests that the greater the specificity of what facts fall within the
insider trading prohibition-as, in the most extreme case, is found under the
Japanese law-the less the law will deter insiders from exploiting their overall
informational advantage. A recent study suggests that there is another way in which
insiders exploit their informational advantages while avoiding prosecution for illegal
and
insider trading. 1'6 This is to trade well in advance of earnings announcements
161
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Determining whether insider trading prohibitions will achieve the economic goal
of promoting deep and liquid stock markets and a lower cost of capital is a much
more complex question. As suggested earlier, the rationale behind this objective is
that individuals who feel at risk of being taken advantage of by persons with inside
information will be less likely to invest in stock. 62 Decrease the risk to outside
investors by enacting insider trading laws, the corollary goes, and outsiders should
become more willing to buy and sell stock, thereby promoting deep and liquid stock
markets. Nevertheless, there are a number of problems with this simple logic.
To begin with, one might question the extent to which persons really are less
willing to invest in stocks because of the fear of insider trading. As stated above, it
appears that considerable trading on inside information goes on in the United States
despite the United States' insider trading law. Nevertheless, large numbers of
Americans invest in stock. Indeed, as mentioned at the outset of this paper, the

158. Exch. Act § 21A. Professor Seyhun found that a 1988 amendment increasing penalties for illegal insider
trading had no impact the ability of insiders to make above-market profits. Incidentally, despite acting twice to
increase penalties for insider trading which violates Rule lOb-5, Congress refused to involve itself in deciding when,
if ever, trading on inside information should violate the law.
159. Seyhun, supra note 60, at 176-77. Of course, Professor Seyhun is assuming that the most likely
explanation for consistent above-market returns for insiders lies in their exploitation of an informational advantage
resulting from their positions. This would seem to be a fair inference in the absence of any other systemic difference
between insiders and other market participants.
160. Bin Ke, Steven Huddart & Kathy Petroni, What Insiders Know About FutureEarningsand How They
Use It: Evidence From Insider Trades (copy of working paper on file with The TransnationalLawyer).
161. Just as few storms appear without some telltale warning-a shift in the wind, a drop in barometric
pressure-events such as a decline in corporate earnings might not often appear without any warnings detectable
by corporate insiders. The problem from a practical enforcement standpoint is proving the existence of such warning
signs and arguing over when these portents reach the level of materiality. Notice, incidentally, this pattern of
insiders moving their trading earlier shows a significant problem with the EU Directive. Specifically, limiting the
prohibition to trading on information which is "precise" allows insiders substantial room to exploit their
informational advantages by trading on the early warning signs of significant corporate events.
162. E.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); EU Directive, supranote 15, Recitals 4-6.
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United States' stock exchanges provide the model of deep and liquid markets to
which the rest of the world aspires.
There are several possible explanations for the evident widespread willingness
of Americans to invest in stock despite the evident widespread trading on inside
information in the United States. From the perspective of a critic of insider trading
laws, an explanation would be that investors do not really care about others trading
on inside information. For example, if the ability to trade on inside information gave
corporate managers an incentive for making better business decisions (because
managers could profit by purchasing stock in advance of public disclosure of good
news), then the added return due to better corporate performance might more than
63
offset the occasional loss from being on the wrong end of an insider trade.'
There is another possible explanation for the willingness of numerous
Americans to invest in stock despite widespread trading on inside information.
Specifically, what determines the willingness of individuals to invest is not how
much trading on inside information actually goes on, but rather how much of such
trading prospective investors think is going on. In other words, an insider trading
prohibition can succeed in its purpose of encouraging investment if the prohibition
creates the perception that there is less trading on inside information. An important
corollary to this observation is that an insider trading prohibition can fail to increase
investor confidence if the perception is that trading on inside information remains
widespread despite the prohibition. Hence, for this purpose, anecdotal evidence
concerning the extent of insider trading actually can provide the more important
measure of success than does a scientific study.
There is yet other answer to the conundrum of widespread stock ownership by
Americans at the same time, one suspects, many Americans believe that trading on
inside information is widespread.'64 It is an oversimplification to suggest that people
will not invest in stock if they fear becoming the victim of another person's trading
on inside information. After all, the return from investing in stock, even when facing
the risk of occasionally being on the wrong end of a trade based upon inside
information, might still be superior to the return on other available investments.
Notice, however, this means that rational investors should demand a higher rate of
return when investing in stock, in order to compensate for the risk of being on the

163. E.g., MANNE, supra note 10, at 131-41. One obvious problem with this argument is that insider trading

also allows managers to sell out their shareholdings without suffering the loss resulting from their bad decisions (or
even to profit from bad decisions by taking short positions). Another argument as to why the overall group of
investors might figure that insider trading does them more good than harm is that it moves the price of stock to
reflect undisclosed information-up to reflect undisclosed good news and down to reflect undisclosed bad

news-with the result that most traders face less risk from inaccurate pricing when purchasing or selling stock. Id.
at 77-91. Of course, promoting earlier public disclosure would seem to better accomplish this result.

164. Every year, in discussing the policies behind the insider trading prohibition, I take an informal poll of
my Business Associations students. I ask how many of them believe that widespread trading on inside information
occurs in American stock markets. Invariably, the vast majority of hands go up. I then ask how many of them, if
they had money to invest, would buy some stocks. Again, the vast majority of hands (including pretty much all those

who gave an affirmative answer to the first question) will go up.

The TransnationalLawyer/ Vol. 15
wrong end of a trade based upon inside information. Indeed, there is some empirical
evidence that this happens.' 65 Hence, enacting an insider trading prohibition might
be expected to decrease corporations' cost of capital-assuming investors perceive
the prohibition to decrease the incidence of trading on inside information-even
though investors still will buy stock in the absence of such a prohibition.
The concern that individuals will cease to investin corporate businesses because
of fear of insider trading is oversimplified in another important manner. One way
to reduce the risk of being on the wrong end of an insider trade is to become an
insider. For instance, individuals or institutions holding substantial percentages of
a corporation's outstanding stock (so-called large blockholders) often have the clout
1 66
to obtain access to corporate information (perhaps through a seat on the board).
Accordingly, worries about insider trading would seem more salient to the small
investor than to the large blockholder. Moreover, small investors often end up
putting their money to work in corporations even if the small investors do not buy
stock. For example, small investors worried about insider trading can put their
money into a bank. The bank, in turn, can use its depositors' money to finance
corporations through loans or, if allowed under the jurisdiction's banking laws, by
taking equity positions. This analysis suggests that the fear of insider trading may
not reduce the total financing available to corporations, nor even necessarily lead
investors to demand a higher return on stock purchases. Instead, the fear of insider
trading might serve to promote large block holdings in corporations, with small
investors putting their money only indirectly into corporate businesses.
This discussion of the differential impact of insider trading on large
blockholders and small investors has a couple of implications. To begin with, it
might help explain why German banks were a major source of the opposition to
adoption of Germany's insider trading law. More fundamentally, this differential
impact brings into focus the relationship between insider trading and broader issues
of comparative corporate governance and finance. Specifically, much recent
scholarship in corporate governance and finance has focused on the fact that large
blockholders commonly dominate the ownership of major corporations outside the
United States; in other words, a relatively small number of institutions or individuals
commonly own a majority of any given foreign corporation's stock.' 67 By contrast,
ownership of major corporations in the United States is typically highly dispersed
so that no one investor has more than a small fraction of the outstanding shares. 68
To the extent that dominance by large blockholders is more efficient than widely

165. Harold Demsetz, CorporateControl,InsiderTrading and Rates of Return, 76 AMER. ECON. REv. 313
(1986) (finding that the stock market tends to discount the stocks of corporations whose insiders trade heavily).
166. See, e.g., Bratton & McCahery, supranote 29, at 226, 261. The notion that large blockholders typically
have access to inside information is the basis for Section 16(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, subjecting 10%
shareholders to forfeiture of profits on short swing trades.
167. See, e.g., id. at 218, 224-25; see also Mark Roe, PoliticalPreconditionsto Separating Ownershipfrom
Corporate Control,53 STAN. L. REV. 539, 542, 562 (2000).
168. Id. at 541.
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dispersed ownership, or, without respect to efficiency, a variety of intractable forces
will preserve large blockholder dominance in non-American corporations, then it
could be undesirable or futile to prohibit insider trading outside the United States in
the hope that this will increase direct ownership of stock by small investors. While
this paper is not a suitable forum for a full discussion of the efficiency or
inevitability of large blockholder dominance in non-American corporations, a brief
introduction should clarify the issues at stake.
The argument that large blockholder dominance can lead to more efficient
management than widely dispersed shareholders reflects an observation known as
the "Berle-Means thesis." This observation is that widely dispersed shareholders
lack the practical ability to control the corporation, with the result that management
in such a corporation is largely accountable only to itself.169 By contrast, if relatively
few institutions or individuals own a substantial portion of the corporation's
outstanding stock, then persons with an economic stake in maximizing corporate
profits have the practical power to keep tabs on management.
In light of the possible efficiencies of large blockholder dominance, one
wonders why many nations have felt the need to pass insider trading laws, as well
as taking a variety of other steps,170 with the express goal of encouraging direct stock
ownership by small investors. In fact, recent years have shaken the notion that large
blockholder dominance is a more efficient way to run a corporation. As noted
earlier, 17 1 in large part, this reflects the comparative economic performance of the
Japanese, European and United States' economies during the 1990s. On a more
sophisticated level, there are some empirical studies and theoretical literature which
suggests (but, by no means conclusively demonstrates) that economies built around
corporations with widely dispersed shareholders and with stocks traded in deep and
liquid securities markets may perform better than economies built around
blockholders and with financing largely coming
corporations dominated by large 72
1
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169. ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY

(1932).
170. See e.g., Bratton & McCahery, supra note 29, at 236-37 (describing Italian, Japanese and French
reforms); see generally Freis, supra note 20 (describing financial market reforms in Germany).
171. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
172. E.g., Black, supra note 30, at 831-38. Professor Black lists a number of difficulties in relying on
financing from banks and major shareholders rather than from strong securities markets. For example, economic
downturns produce problem loans for banks. This, in turn, leads to credit becoming unavailable to corporations
relying on bank financing. In addition, during downturns, large blockholders often send good money after bad to
prop up weak subsidiaries. Moreover, self dealing by large blockholders often can turn into outright looting in
difficult economic times, which, in turn, can magnify the economic downturn. Accordingly, Professor Black thinks
it is not coincidental that the East Asian countries which best survived the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis either
had relatively strong stock markets or else a mostly closed economy. On the positive side, strong securities markets
can attract foreign investors to spur local growth, and permit venture capital investor support of new enterprises (by
allowing venture capital firms to cash out through initial public offerings).
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Even if large blockholder dominance is not more efficient as a general
proposition, there may be various reasons why such dominance is not likely to
change for non-American corporations. If so, then prohibiting insider trading might
not fundamentally increase the amount of direct stock holdings by small investors.
For example, a recent article contains an argument that large blockholder dominance
is a natural reaction to pro-labor policies of social democracies because blockholders
can exercise some check on managers' tendencies to pursue labor friendly practices
at the expense of shareholder profits. 173 Others have argued that large blockholder
dominance is the result of weak corporate law protections for minority
shareholders. 174 For example, the risk that insiders will exploit their positions
through unfair self-dealing transactions with the corporation, if not deterred by a
nation's corporation laws, might chill share ownership by small investors, or lead
them to demand a higher rate of return to compensate for the risk. Interestingly,
among the insiders who might exploit shareholders with small holdings, either by
trading on inside information, or by entering unfair transactions with the
corporation, are large blockholders. This fact has led Professors Bratton and
McCahery to argue that prohibitions on insider trading in nations with large
blockholder dominance might only lead to more self-dealing by such large
with the result that small investors still shy away from owning
blockholders,
1 75
stock.
Ultimately, however, the question of whether insider trading prohibitions will
promote deep and liquid markets, and decrease the cost of capital, should yield an
empirical answer. A recent study by Professors Bhattacharya and Daouk 176 suggests
that there is some positive news in this regard. By using four sets of available
statistics, which the two professors contend can serve as surrogates for the cost of
capital in a nation, Professors Bhattacharya and Daouk examined whether insider
trading laws decreased the cost of capital in the nations around the world that have
enacted such laws. 17 7 They found that the enactment of insider trading prohibitions
produced no statistically significant impact. 178 However, they also found that a
statistically significant improvement in the cost of capital in a nation occurred after
the first prosecution took place under the nation's insider trading laws. 179 In other

173. Roe, supra note 167, at 595.
174. E.g., John Coffee, The Future as History: The Prospectsfor Global Convergence in Corporate
Governance and Its Implications,93 Nw. U. L. REV. 641,644 (1999).
175. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 29, at 294-95. Of course, one might respond that an insider trading
prohibition should be part of a range of measures designed to protect small shareholders and thereby encourage
highly dispersed shareholdings. Professors Bratton and McCahery argue, however, that the ability to self-deal or
trade on inside information might provide the necessary reward for large block holders to maintain their positions
(rather than reducing their risks through diversification). Id. at 293-97. Hence, the issue might come back to the
question as to whether large blockholder dominance is efficient and therefore worth preserving.
176. See Bhattacharya & Daouk, supra note 5.
177. Il at 7.
178. Id. at 44.
179. Id. at 42.
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words, while mere enactment of insider trading laws apparently produces no impact
on investor confidence, efforts to enforce the law do.
V. CONCLUSION: LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

One advantage often touted for federalism in the United States is that different
laws among different states can serve as a laboratory to test the impact of different
legal rules. The nationalization of the insider trading prohibition in the United States
through Rule 1Ob-5 has pretty well drowned out experimentation involving different
insider trading laws within the United States. In the absence of domestic
experimentation, it is useful to see what insights the United States can gain from the
experiences of other nations that have enacted insider trading laws that follow
different statutory formulations and philosophies.
One lesson for the United States could come from the results of Professors
Bhattacharya's and Daouk's study suggesting that enforcement of insider trading
prohibitions lowers the cost of capital. Such results, if confirmed by further analysis,
could provide a strong response to critics of insider trading prohibitions. One
interesting possibility for additional empirical research along this sort of line would
be to see if there are different impacts on the cost of capital depending upon the
variations in the insider trading prohibition. In any event, there is an interesting
implication to Professors Bhattacharya's and Daouk's conclusion that enforcement,
rather than mere enactment, of insider trading prohibitions produces an impact on
the cost of capital. This suggests that resources devoted to enforcement might be
more important than the formulation of the legal prohibition.' 80 There is one
important caveat to this suggestion. To the extent that the formulation makes
convictions difficult, or, as suggested by studies in the United States, simply shifts
trading on inside information into more subtle forms, then one might expect less
impact on lowering the cost of capital. 8'
Another lesson for the United States could come from the different statutory
formulations used abroad. If Congress or the SEC ever decide to draft a specific
insider trading prohibition, rather than punt to the courts' interpretation of Rule l Ob5, the formulations found in other nations' insider trading prohibitions (such as the

180. In this regard, a comparison of the enforcement and penalty provisions of various insider trading
prohibitions arguably would be more useful than Figure l's comparison of the substantive scope of the prohibitions.
Professor Seyhun's study, however, suggests that increasing the size of the penalty will not decrease trading on
inside information unless the substantive scope of the prohibition, and the enforcement of the prohibition, create
a real risk that trading on inside information will result in imposition of a penalty. Moreover, a comparison of the
formal enforcement provisions of the insider trading laws tells one little regarding the resources, sophistication and
zeal of the agency charged with enforcement of the statute. See, e.g., Black, supra note 30, at 807, 811 (discussing
the resources, sophistication and commitment it takes to enforce laws against self-dealing in general, and insider
trading in particular).
181. In fact, the rationale behind Australia's expansion of its prohibition to an equal access approach was that
the prior laws had been difficult to enforce and, hence, trading on inside information had not been deterred. E.g.,
Karmel, supra note 21, at 1152.
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EU Directive) could provide examples of possible clarifying language, as well as
examples of poor drafting to avoid. More broadly, Australia's experience with an
equal access rule might prove that from a policy perspective, there may have been
no reason for the Supreme Court to reject the equal access approach in Chiarella.

